The recent financial crisis has provoked a raft of contending claims as to whether the cause of the crisis is better attributed to market failure or political failure. Such claims are predicated on a presumption that markets and polities are meaningfully separate entities. To the contrary, we argue that contemporary arrangements create an entangled political economy that renders theorizing based on separation often misleading. Within this alternative framework of entangled political economy, questions of market or polity as the source of crisis recede into the analytical background. What comes into the foreground is recognition that crisis is a systemic feature of a system of deeply entangled political economy. Control over such crises is thus more a matter of constitutional-level endeavors to curb the extent of entanglement. We use this framework of entangled political economy to illuminate both the recent Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and the New Deal's National Recovery Act (NRA).
A Theory of Entangled Political Economy, with Application to TARP
and NRA 1
Introduction
The recent disturbances within financial markets, along with the accompanying recession, have caused reverberations within academic circles as well as throughout the economies of the world. Within academic circles, a clear polarity has appeared concerning the locus of blame. On one side of that polarity stand claims that the crisis is an instance of market failure, which demonstrates the need for stronger regulatory control over markets, as illustrated by Cohan (2009 ), Posner (2009 ), and Schiller (2008 . On the other side stand claims that the crisis is a manifestation of excessive regulation, the remedy for which is less regulation, as illustrated by Sowell (2009) , Taylor (2009) , White (2008) , and Woods (2009).
We do not seek here to adjudicate these contending claims, at least not in any direct fashion, because our object of analytical interest is the theory of political economy and not macro-level instability per se. 2 Our concern here is with the conceptual treatment of systems of political economy, using some macro-level material associated with economic disturbance to provide substantive content. "Political economy" is a compound term formed from the elements polity and economy, each of which in turn can be conceptualized as pure forms. The question at hand is how to combine those 1 The authors express appreciation to two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments and criticisms. 2 We would demur, however, from the numerous remarks that have claimed that the recent events have
shown the inadequacy of all macro-level theories. They have shown the inadequacy of theories of the income-expenditure variety where present actions produce current results. But Austrian-style theories, where credit expansion today can cause a boom tomorrow while also causing a bust the day after tomorrow have been generally on the mark. While much work remains to be done in developing this line of explanation, as Wagner (1999) explores, it does explain how credit expansion can produce a sequence of boom-and-bust. pure forms to arrive at political economy. The common way is to do so through sequential addition, as conveyed crisply in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006) . Within this framework, market equilibrium is established theoretically prior to and independently of political action, with subsequent political intervention establishing an alternative equilibrium. This sequential and separable framework is, of course, used to divergent effect: Where some claim that political intervention promotes Pareto efficiency or something close to it, others claim that it generates significant losses associated with rent seeking (Tullock 1967 ) and rent extraction (McChesney 1997) .
The separated framework leads naturally to efforts to locate the source of disturbance as originating in either polity or economy. For instance, Congleton (2009) attributes the recent disturbance largely to market processes; alternatively, Rowley and Smith (2009) conclude that causation resides with political action. In contrast, our framework of entangled and simultaneous political economy, as sketched in Wagner (2006 Wagner ( , 2007 , highlights a third possible option: The recent disturbance is a systemic feature of a constitutional system of entangled political economy. 3 We start by setting forth our framework of entangled political economy and compare it with separated political economy. After doing this we examine two historical episodes to illustrate the explanatory ability of the entangled framework. The first of those episodes is the recent development of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP); the second is the National Recovery Act (NRA) of the New Deal.
3 In this vein, we would note that Oliver Kessler (2009) likewise advances a systemic line of explanation, though from an analytic orientation grounded in economic sociology.
II. Two Conceptualizations of Political Economy
Any analytical framework unavoidably highlights some phenomena while ignoring other phenomena. Within the framework of separated political economy, the final societal equilibrium is generated by sequential addition over two distinct institutional frameworks: a market framework governed by private property and freedom of contract and a constitutional framework that governs political transactions. Actions taken in the political arena thus modify the equilibrium established within the market arena. A further significant feature of this framework is that polity and economy are each conceptualized as single, point-mass entities that act upon one another. Figure 1 illustrates this analytical framework. The polity is denoted by the octagon, the economy by the square. As shown there, the polity acts as a single massed entity on the economy which responds as a single massed entity by shifting from E to E * due to political action on the economy, much as one billiard ball would act upon another. Separated political economy theorizes by a process of layered addition.
The theory proceeds smoothly and sequentially, with economic entities acting first and political entities second. The outcome of this model of political economy corresponds to what we observe after the second move.
The alternative framework of entangled political economy differs in several significant respects from that of separated political economy. For one thing, polity and economy are not conceptualized through reduction to point-mass status. There is, after all, nothing about billiard balls that would allow entanglement. For entanglement to be possible, the entities must be conceptualized as networks of relationships where individual nodes craft particular connections with other nodes, and with those connections running through both arenas of action. Furthermore, market and political actions are undertaken simultaneously, and within an institutional framework that is open to all actors in both arenas. Polity and economy are both arenas of activity that contain numerous interacting enterprises that are connected in network fashion whose systemic properties depend on the structure of the network. While competition among and across commercial and political entities is a key characteristic of the entangled political economy, specialized and divided knowledge is a central feature of this process (Hayek 1945) . Smith and Yandle (2009) explain how this divided knowledge generates global patterns that were never the direct object of any participant's choice, but rather were emergent properties of systemic interaction. As agreements are reached, statutes modified, and regulations written, a package of outcomes emerges that no one has chosen, not even senior members of the legislative and executive branches of government. Each participant pursues opportunities for gain within a networked system of complex interaction where the overall outcome is not a product of intentional choice.
This formulation of entangled political economy is not new, though the reductionist-driven imperative of tractable modeling has relegated it to the background of theoretical inquiry. For instance, Jonathan Hughes (1977) presents a wide-ranging account of entangled political economy going back to colonial times in America, where polity and economy evolved simultaneously through entangled interaction (Yandle, 1984) . On a conceptual level, Jane Jacobs (1992) describes societal processes that evolve through interaction between institutional carriers of two distinct moralities, which she describes as the commercial and the guardian moral syndromes. A central feature of her analysis is her treatment of some of the debilitating qualities of certain patterns of entanglement, and which she describes as "monstrous moral hybrids," and which to some extent is reflected in Jonah Goldberg's (2008) treatment of Liberal Fascism and also in Bruce Yandle's (1983) treatment of Baptists and bootleggers. Indeed, entanglement-driven regulation that delivers special benefits for one part or sector of the political economy while imposing costs on another is recognized as far back as Magna Charta (Yandle, 1984) and as recently as the 2010 debate over cap-and-trade carbon emission regulation (Yandle, 2010b) . In those two cases and with entanglement generally, political connections and social structure, long developed between interest groups and political power brokers, become energized and highly visible when some political or economic shock sets the stage for action. At other times, lobbyists and politicians, whose political survival depends on serving and balancing the demands of multiple competing interests, happily maintain the connecting networks.
Our analytical framework has both similarities to and differences with Sanford Ikeda's (1997) and Steve Littlechild's (1997) treatments of the dynamics of interventionism. The similarities reside in a common concern with the systemic properties of interaction between economic and political entities, and with entanglement in both cases being a continuing process. The differences reside in our use of a network-based formulation in contrast to the field-based formulation of Ikeda and Littlechild. As Jason Potts (2000) explains, network-based formulations are more suitable for exploring patterns of continual evolution where the emphasis is placed on particular patterns of entanglement and not on the general presence of entanglement.
Thus our formulation extends the earlier formulations by supplying some gain-seeking logic by which particular patterns of entanglement are generated.
With regard to institutional arrangements, Elinor Ostrom (1986) reminds us that it is not sufficient to describe the political process as exogenous if we hope to understand outcomes as they emerge in naturally-occurring environments. It is necessary to go further by undertaking an examination of the actual organization of decision-making in particular institutional contexts, because different particular contexts can yield different patterns of outcome, as Ostrom (2005) explains. Only in this way will we be able to understand why certain outcomes emerge rather than others. Ostrom's theme informs our own effort to work with a theory of entangled political economy because we think that this institutional framework more accurately reflects the institutional framework from which the present situation has emerged.
III. Entangled Political Economy and the Triadic Architecture of Exchange
Within the pure theory of a market economy, a transaction entails a dyadic relationship between buyer and seller, and with the terms of trade reflecting agreement between buyer and seller. Those transactions can be aggregated and then reasonably reduced to a representative transaction without losing economically significant information. A credit transaction within the pure theory of a market economy would involve a relationship between borrower and lender and no one else. In choosing among borrowers, lenders would choose based on their appraisal of the anticipated commercial value of proposed transactions, as this value is governed within the framework of private property and freedom of contract. A borrower whose offer is rejected by a lender can try other lenders, but transactions between borrowers and lenders are dyadic relationships in any case.
Political action can be introduced into such transactions in two distinct ways, as
Walter Eucken (1952) explains in his distinction between political actions that are market conformable and those that are not. While it may be doubtful that market conformability is a dichotomous state as against denoting some continuum, the distinction between conformable and non-conformable actions still has traction in distinguishing separated from entangled political economy. 4 Should political actions conform to the operating features of the market economy, the outcome could be described as an instance of separated political economy. Political action would affect all credit transactions in non-discriminatory fashion, in which case it would still be 4 In similar fashion, neutral taxation surely depicts a continuum and not a dichotomy. The alleged neutrality of a head tax assumes wrongly that heads can be counted accurately independently of the size of the tax. A head tax may be comparatively neutral among contemporary tax instruments, but the enumerated size of a population would surely vary inversely with the size of the tax.
reasonable to reduce the aggregate of credit transactions to a representative transaction. Figure 1 denotes a situation where political actions are market conformable in that they act upon the market as an entity and are neutral toward the pattern of activities within the market. Within a framework of separated political economy, political action tweaks market outcomes without modifying the modus operandi of the market process. Market transactions would retain their dyadic quality, with a polity entity offering bounties to market-based entities but without getting involved in the operation of those entities.
In contrast, political actions that are non-conformable with market processes generate an entangled political economy, one illustration of which is presented in figure   2 . Within this alternative framework, transactions are triadic as political entities participate in market transactions. It is no longer reasonable to reduce some market aggregate to a representative transaction because the behavior of that aggregate will vary with the particular network structure from which the aggregate emerges; such networks are scale-free, so there is no scale by which an aggregate can be reduced to a representative transaction (Barabási 2002 Profit takes on different form when pursued by political entities than when pursued by market entities. There is, however, no unique form that pursuit takes, which injects further complication into economic calculation. Figure 3 illustrates this point.
Political entities are organized within a framework of inalienable ownership, in contrast to market entities. Hence, profit cannot be appropriated directly through political entities.
Yet profit is always present because it merely signifies mutual gains for the parties to a transaction. Hence, a nonprofit status does not eliminate the search for profit but only changes the paths taken by that search. Panel A illustrates an exchange between two market entities denoted by the squares, and with each party expecting to profit from the trade as denoted by the arrows running to the small circles outside the squares. Panel B illustrates a similar exchange when one party is a political entity. While both sides expect to profit, political profit cannot be appropriated directly, and yet the anticipation of profit will be there or else the enterprise would not have been sponsored. The small triangle located between and to the right of the political and market entities indicates that profit is channeled in some indirect fashion, as illustrated by the cloud into which that profit flows. The image of the cloud is meant to cover the variety of particular ways that such profit might be appropriated: It could be appropriated though higher prices paid to particular input suppliers; it could also be appropriated by offering lower prices to favored buyers. Regardless of the form of appropriation, entangled political economy will feature the appropriation of profits through triadic exchange relationships.
Entangled political economy theorizes in terms of universal profit-seeking pursued simultaneously in both arenas. While political entities cannot appropriate profit directly from their activities, successful political action will nonetheless create profits to be appropriated, for profit is just another word for gain. What we have is universal competition as a feature of universal scarcity, only with the enterprises that engage in competitive activity doing so under different institutional rules of property rights that create setting of cooperation-cum-conflict that we denote as entangled political economy.
With respect to panel B of figure 3, some political entities may be characterized as Big Players (Koppl and Yeager 1996; Koppl 2002 an attorney general, the dispute may play out differently. For one thing, the attorney general cannot claim any residual for settling the dispute. Even more, continuation of the dispute might generate valued publicity for an attempt at higher office. In any case, the attorney general would generally not operate according to the same language of economic calculation as ordinary market participants.
Credit markets provide particularly good material for the operation of entangled political economy in light of the presence of Big Players. A credit transaction is a form of rental contract where a lender hands over temporary possession of an asset to a borrower. Rental contracts create opportunities for asset conversion that are not present with sales contracts, and so different institutional arrangements have grown up around rental contracts. The conversion of dyadic transactions into triadic transactions through the entrance of Big Players would seem to provide particularly fruitful analytical opportunities, which could not be so readily addressed within a framework of separated political economy. Most of those opportunities relate to changes inside orthodox aggregates rather than to aggregates themselves, with resulting changes in aggregates reflecting systemic properties of an entangled political economy, as we shall now explore in some detail for two specific cases.
IV. Current Episode: The TARP as Illuminated by Entangled Political Economy
We draw upon two episodes of crisis to better illuminate the relevance of our theory of entangled political economy. Though we maintain that entanglement is a relevant organizing framework during all periods of politico-economic activity, we argue that moments of crisis are particularly useful in demonstrating this relevance because 1) crisis accelerates interaction between the two orders as demand for political responses increase in the wake of undesirable macro-outcomes (see Higgs, 1987) , 2) new relationships are formed across nodes as traditional boundaries are less respected, and
3) entanglement occurs with greater transparency both because of the previous two arguments and because participants in the entanglement process are more likely to favor expediency over palatability.
To demonstrate how entanglement theory illuminates actions taken in a highly energized political economy, we must 1) explain how an entangled field for action is first formed by key political economy players, then 2) identify the energized linkages that brighten during stressful times to deliver specialized benefits to emerging Big Players and related economic agents in the political economy, and 3) show how an entanglement contagion develops that embraces other firms and industries in an inspired regulatory process. Along the way, we must describe the "gears in the transmission" that makes the transfer mechanism work for key players. Our entanglement story offers a superior explanation to events relative to other theories of regulation such as public interest, capture, or special interest theory.
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In applying our theory, we first draw on the events that led to the creation of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). We first must call attention to the [2007] [2008] international financial collapse and world recession that preceded TARP. What followed in the U.S. was the most serious economic recession since World War II. We note that the collapse was associated with an unusual 2001-2005 expansion of credit for adjustable-rate mortgage lending to less-qualified borrowers and to investors (Taylor, 2009, 1-10). As described by Yandle (2010a) and others, the credit financial collapse has no single cause that might be attributed to one overriding component or agent of the political economy but is rather the result of interacting necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions instigated by rent-seeking interest groups that together had formed a economically vulnerable political/social structure which ultimately collapsed. Included in the structure were long-established linkages that delivered benefits from an entangled set of political agents, central bankers and regulatory agencies to mortgage bankers and lenders, credit rating agencies, accounting rule makers, insurance companies, and international broker/dealers. This was at a time when interest rates were low and the U.S. government was dedicated to expanding home ownership among lower-income citizens (Sowell 2009, 30-50; Wallin 2008; Yandle 2010a) . Enlarged use of the securitization and sale of mortgage-related debt instruments by major Wall Street bankers further accommodated the expanded lending. Mortgage-backed bonds found their way into the portfolios of financial and other institutions worldwide. The subsequent financial collapse became known as the subprime crisis, referring to a category of mortgages held as assets by major financial institutions. The magnitude and scope of ownership of these assets was so large and their value so questionable that banks, financial institutions and even governments worldwide found themselves teetering at the margin of bankruptcy. It was in the throes of this crisis that the connecting political economy linkages became highly energized and U.S. government officials supported a series of unprecedented actions. We draw on three episodes in the evolution of the TARP demonstrating the consequences of these newly energized entanglement network of relationships that connected political and market enterprises.
1: Key Events in the Crisis and the Thickening of Entanglement
Our first episode covers the emergence of the TARP in response to the financial crisis. We note that at the time when TARP emerged, the linkages between politicians, central banker, regulators, private bankers and insurance companies were well established and functioning. Robert Higgs (1987) explains how the arrival of a crisis provides opportunities for profit the exploitation of which thickens and energizes the extent of entanglement. The resulting stronger linkages and thickened entanglement are pertinacious and consequently remain in place after the crisis has passed (see Tullock, 1975 considered, including providing cash by taking an equity ownership in the failing firms.
However, a plan replaced this option that went directly to the problem, the deeply depressed mortgage-backed securities held by banks. Using the TARP, the Treasury would purchase these so-called toxic assets, hold them, and later sell them off, hopefully at a higher price than paid for them. In effect, the Fed was to become a hedge fund manager. But, of course, taking the action required congressional approval.
The direct interaction of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and Congress that followed ended at least temporarily but perhaps permanently the much-celebrated independent position held by the U.S. central bank since the end of World War II.
In remarks before Congress, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson claimed:
We have proposed a program to remove troubled assets from the system. This troubled asset relief program has to be properly designed for immediate implementation and be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence. It must also protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible, and include provisions that ensure transparency and oversight while also ensuring the program can be implemented quickly and run effectively... …Over these past days, it has become clear that there is bipartisan consensus for an urgent legislative solution. We need to build upon this spirit to enact this bill quickly and cleanly, and avoid slowing it down with other provisions that are unrelated or don't have broad support. This troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to help homeowners, the American people and stimulate our economy.
8
This initiative was first met with skepticism; on its first run through Congress, the statute failed to pass. A second attempt, however, which included certain unrelated provisions that may be thought of as side-payments, was successful and signed into law on without required accountability to congress or transparency of action so that taxpayers would be able to know who was being favored and who was not.
TARP represented a shift in the underlying constitutional order of how political enterprises relate to market enterprises with respect to financial intermediation, property rights, and the ability of boards of directors and corporate officers to manage their enterprises. This new enterprise was not grounded in the same bedrock as the political enterprises it replaced. The defining of new entanglement territory was soon evident as the means to induce financial stability began to change rapidly in terms of the rhetoric and actions of the key political actors involved in its administration.
The ostensible purpose of the TARP, and the purpose in place when Congress approved the initiative, was to buy up so-called "toxic assets," those assets held by banks that were considered worthless due to their basis in the failing mortgage derivatives market. Yet as Congleton (2009) It is critical to our theory that congressional leadership accepted rather quietly Mr.
Paulson's declaration of unlimited power to conduct the nation's business. Our entanglement theory predicts energizing and expanding the arteries that support the flow of politically produced transfers to economic agents already connected to the political engine.
2: The Gears in the TARP Transmission
It compliance with his plan of purchasing preferred stock by telling them that noncompliance "would leave you vulnerable and exposed" and further threatening regulation.
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The Treasury soon extended this change in the allocation of the TARP funds beyond these initial nine firms. The Treasury described this new allocation method as follows:
Under the program, Treasury will purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred shares on standardized terms as described in the program's term sheet. The program will be available to qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, and certain bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged only in financial activities that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) on November 14, 2008. Treasury will determine eligibility and allocations for interested parties after consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency… …Companies participating in the program must adopt the Treasury Department's standards for executive compensation and corporate governance, for the period during which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. These standards generally apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next three most highly compensated executive officers. We don't believe it is tenable to opt out because doing so would leave you vulnerable and exposed. -If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware that your regulator will require it in any circumstance.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/files/documents/2009/Treasury-CEO-TalkingPoints.pdf 13 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm. In addition to this noted activity, the Federal Reserve Board dramatically expanded the direct purchase of debt instruments including commercial paper from the commercial banking system. As a result, the Fed's balance sheet has shown unprecedented growth, raising serious concerns as to how the Fed will ultimately "unwind" its some $1 trillion in newly acquired paper (Hamilton, 2009, 67-84) .
how commercial organizations long accustomed to operating in a highly charged political economy adapted to the new political landscape by altering the nature of their transactions and/or appealing to newly endowed authorities using other politically expedient devices. We trace the shift in the objectives of the TARP to accommodate these various industries starting with its purchase of additional senior stocks in American Insurance Group (AIG). AIG, the world's largest insurance company, had invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities and was also the leading writer of insurance, termed "credit default swaps," which protected subprime mortgage investors from default losses. AIG was technically bankrupt because of the operating losses related to the combination of investments and contracts.
With financial linkages that reached across the entire financial community, the government viewed AIG as too big to fail. This made AIG a Big Player, which is to say a firm without a bankruptcy constraint. As a result, the federal government had already become increasingly entangled with AIG, even before the establishment of the TARP. Treasury will make these loans using authority provided for the Troubled Asset Relief Program. While the purpose of this program and the enabling legislation is to stabilize our financial sector, the authority allows us to take this action. Absent Congressional action, no other authorities existed to stave off a disorderly bankruptcy of one or more auto companies.
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As the GM and Chrysler restructuring drew to an end, Senator Mike Johanns (R., Neb), without realizing, described the key difference between an entangled crisis-driven process and the separated political process that would have taken place normally on the political commons: "I never would have believed as a candidate for the U.S. Senate that the U.S. government could buy GM without a hearing, with no vote, yes or no.
There are billions and billions of dollars at stake here" (Mitchell, 2009 ). Put differently, there was ignorance, rational or otherwise, regarding the total impact of the TARP-aided auto deal, but those with the most at stake were obviously well informed.
4: Making the Transition from Crisis to Leviathan
The third period of our study describes how entanglement has spread into other features of the regulatory landscape. In particular, we point to such features as the oversight of executive compensation by a White House "Special Master for
Compensation," a new and significant entanglement that has little to do with the original crisis (Solomon, 2009a) . Going beyond the TARP fund recipients, Treasury Secretary
Geithner pushed for legislative authority to regulate executive pay for all financial institutions (Solomon, 2009b) . The emerging rules will move this feature of entangled regulation to a more stable position on the political commons. The growing regulation of financial institutions makes that sector look more like public utilities than market driven corporations subject to some regulatory constraints.
As executive pay and other constraints began to emerge, early recipients of 
V. Historical Episode: The NIRA as Illuminated by Entangled Political Economy
Our historical episode of entanglement occurred during the Great Depression.
We draw parallels in entanglement between these separate episodes to demonstrate how unoriginal the TARP really is. Indeed our analysis calls into question the various normative policy suggestions typically offered in times of crisis, which invariably advocate yet more entanglement. Once again, we must 1) explain how an entangled field for action is first formed by key political economy players, then 2) identify the energized linkages that brighten during stressful times to deliver specialized benefits to emerging Big Players and related economic agents in the political economy, and 3) as an anti-price cutting law, replaced the price codes. This legislative step illustrates the ever thickening entanglement among commercial and political enterprises.
The Great Depression was the crisis trigger. An international financial market meltdown followed by Federal Reserve and protectionist action yielded a deep economic collapse (Timin, 1976) . Out of the ashes came the New Deal and the 1933 legislation marathon that yielded the NIRA. There are obvious parallels between the TARP story and this one. In both cases, a severe credit market shock, hurry-up legislation, and special deal-making in the executive branch pushed the political economy into thickening entanglement. In this case, as with TARP, major industries, firms, and their agents had earlier formed close regulatory relationships with government. As documented by Higgs (1987) , entanglement did not start with the New Deal, but rather with controls that emerged in World War I.
In placing his signature on the NIRA, President Roosevelt said (Deering, Homan, Lorwin, and Lyon, 1934, 1) : History probably will record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress. It represents a supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make for the prosperity and the preservation of American standards. Its goal is the assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor, with the elimination of the piratical methods and practices which have not only harassed honest business but also contributed to the ills of labor.
The NIRA signing, moreover, was just one in a series of statutes signed in a matter of hours. These included the Glass-Steagall Act, which established new constraints on banking and initiated the FDIC, and legislation that reorganized the U.S. railroads (Alter, 2006, 304-305) . Mr. Roosevelt reserved his most expansive comments for the NIRA statute, which he signed last in the series.
Described by Powell (2003, 113) as "FDR's biggest bet, his best hope, the flagship of the New Deal," the act gave Mr. Roosevelt almost unlimited power to intervene and manage the U.S. economy. With the signing of the NIRA, the president set in force activities that would eliminate child labor, set minimum wages for every U.S.
industry, but not the same minimum wage, establish the maximum number of hours in the work week, require recognition of organized labor in the work place, and establish a gigantic bureaucracy for managing the federal cartel that was formed. In terms of our theory, Mr. Roosevelt and his operatives were "grazing" on a policy commons with most of the constitutional barbed wire cut and stored away, at least temporarily. The time was ripe to energize existing arteries that connected government and commercial agents and to enlarge the network by several orders of magnitude.
Just as now, there was a growing animus against capitalism and capitalists, especially those with high earnings and newly accumulated wealth. The NIRA drew on the model of Mussolini's fascism, which was popular at the time, and the idea that the corporate state could best manage a depression economy. Many leaders then believed that a new age of collective action and national planning had arrived, that free-market capitalism was a dead letter.
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In a hearing on the act, Senator Robert F. Wagner, a leading proponent, emphasized that the time for planning and rationalization had arrived. He said Competition is not abolished; it is only made rational. In this bill we say that business may not compete by reducing wages below the American standard of living, by sweating labor, or by resorting to unfair practices. Competition is limited to legitimate and honorable bids in the market and real gains in technical efficiency (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin and Lyon, 1934, 11) . The NIRA's preamble addressed the serious emergency faced by the nation, and in a first component empowered the president to develop industrial codes, industrial and labor coordination, gave the president power to regulate all prices and wages and addressed specifically the power of the president to regulate oil prices and pipeline operations (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin, and Lyon, 1934, 116-124) . Full of enthusiasm for the task that lay before him, General Johnson used all the creativity he could muster to rally support for the Blue Eagle, the ubiquitous symbol he adopted for the NRA. He allowed businesses that toed the NRA line to fly the Blue Eagle flag and affix the Eagle imprimatur on their packages and in their advertisements, and urged consumers to boycott non-Eagle producers (Higgs, 1987, 179) .
Once the NRA bureaucracy was up and running, there were 54 state and regional offices with 1,400 employees nationwide (Taylor, 2002, 2) . Approximately 700 industrial codes were put in place and these dealt with more than 150 trade practices, such as advertising, packaging, and product standardization. Along with codes came more than 11,000 administrative orders that affected some 2.3 million employers (Powell, 2003, 121) . In June 1935, the National Industrial Conference Board, the predecessor to today's Conference Board, reported that the NRA's two year operating cost had totaled $93.8 million, which is equivalent to $ As might be expected, leaders of many major American corporations along with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly supported the NRA. Indeed, when signed into law, the president of the U.S. Chamber referred to the act as the "Magna Charta of industry and labor" (Powell, 2003, 114) . 27 Major players wanted to be regulated.
Another major component of the act focused on labor and labor relations. The NIRA effectively required industry to bargain collectively with organized labor and established a government mechanism for settling labor disputes. The NIRA codes set minimum prices, minimum wages, and maximum hours allowed in a workweek, based on a misguided theory that higher prices would translate into larger revenues for firms so that workers' take-home pay would increase.
That some industries were anxious to organize under the Blue Eagle cartel is revealed from the fact that the U.S. cotton textile industry had its NIRA code written and approved by the president on July 9, 1933, less than one month after Mr. Roosevelt 27 The codes and trade association coordination components of the act, known as the Swope Plan, had been promoted for several years by Gerard Swope, president of General Electric (Powell, 113) . Herbert Hoover had rejected the Swope Plan in 1931, calling it and its supporters "sheer fascism." signed the authorizing legislation (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin and Lyon, 1934, 141) . The textile code illustrates the entangled fine-tuning accomplished within the context of the NRA, which also identifies one of the more interesting gears in the NRA transmission.
Among other things, the textile code established minimum wages for just that industry with a small differential for northern and southern mills, $13 for a 40-hour week in the north; $12 in the south (Powell, 2003, 121-122) . The wages set were significantly higher than those prevailing at the time. The cotton textile manufacturing was rapidly moving south, and organized textile workers in the north used the Blue Eagle opportunity to raise wages and close the wage gap. New England textile mill operators dominated the textile trade association. The first industry entangled with the Blue Eagle was the textile industry.
2: Difficulties in Building and Keeping the Cartel
Just as with Treasury attempts to herd major U.S. banks into a TARP cartel, not every firm and industry was so cooperative with the Blue Eagle. Henry Ford refused to sign the auto code drafted by General Motors and Chrysler. Powell (2003, 125-127) tells about Ford's opposition and how, because of this, the NRA threatened him with losing a bid to supply trucks to the government, just as Secretary Paulson threatened TARP-reluctant bankers with regulatory threats. Ford was the low bidder and, ironically, paid the highest wages in the industry. While Ford won that bid, shortly thereafter Mr.
Roosevelt issued an executive order that denied government business to any firm that did not fly the Blue Eagle. Mr. Ford's sales increased that year without government business.
Mr. Ford was not alone in his Blue Eagle opposition. As the NRA expanded its reach with codes and other rules, a growing number of "misfits" began to emerge. Put another way, the cartel was costly to maintain. For example, in July 1934, in a first united protest against the NRA, a group of Bronx printers turned in their Blue Eagles in protest against the Graphic Arts Code that included them (70 Bronx Printers Return Blue Eagle, 1934) . The printers had petitioned relief from code-set wages. A representative for the group indicated that the Blue Eagle wages were about double those that prevailed before the code was adopted. Expressing support of the NRA concept and not wanting to appear radical, the statement went on:
It is unfair to expect medium or small-sized shops to pay the same scale of wages as the large plants when general conditions such as the amount and type of business and volume of production is taken into consideration. This schedule will place an unfair hardship on most of us and force many of us to go out of business (70 Bronx Printers Return Blue Eagle, 1934) .
Quite possibly, the larger firms in the industry knew exactly what they were doing when they contracted for a code that raised competitors' costs.
There were also occasions where special deals made by the NRA to some firms in an industry, but not to all, led to policy reversals (Cotton Pay Rise Exemptions Are To further illustrate the regulatory detail, under the rule in question "(1) It was required that an employee of the seller reach into a crate of chickens and grab out the birds one by one as they came to hand; (2) it was required that the buyer accept the chicken thus pulled forth" (End of NRA, 1935, B1) . This was the so-called "straight killing" rule, which prohibited selecting individual chickens from a crate. On June 20, 1934, a Schechter allowed a customer to pick and chose several chickens from a crate, rejecting some perfectly healthy chickens in the process. It was outright chicken discrimination, illegal under the code.
statute that outlawed price-cutting. They passed the Connolly Hot Oil Act earlier, on February 22, 1935. That piece of temporary legislation was then extended to replace the petroleum regulations in the NIRA. When considered in their entirety, the new legislation provided uniform wage and hour regulations, guaranteed the right of labor to organize with union representation of its choosing, eliminated child labor, cartelized oil production, and prohibited price-cutting. In terms of social structure, the NIRA had established trade associations as a prevalent American institution for lobbying and favor-seeking, and the NRA experience made Washington, D.C. the center of the nation's political economy. Thus, the arteries that linked together political and commercial agents were made intact; enlarged entanglement became a permanent feature of the modern U.S. economy.
VI. Some Concluding Remarks
As our narrative illustrates, the entanglement of political and commercial enterprises typically thickens and expands in times of crisis, and with new degrees of entanglement becoming new norms going forward. What we witness in instances of crisis is the variable turbulence that is an operating characteristic of a system of entangled political economy. This perspective is hidden from the framework of separated political economy because that framework offers no theoretical space for emergent action within the aggregates we denote as polity and economy to transform a system of political economy. Entrepreneurs are always looking for profit opportunities;
however, periods of crisis perhaps provide particular opportunities for seeking profits that generate systemic changes of an emergent nature that have enduring consequences, whether for good or bad. This analysis is not meant to suggest that entanglement is initiated only by political entrepreneurs. For market actors are in many cases just as eager to increase their interaction with political enterprises. Such activity falls under the label of "rentseeking" and an inalienable feature of the political marketplace. This observation calls into question at least one aspect of those who would argue that crises are purely a result of unrestrained political intervention. It must be recognized that political action can just as easily be initiated from market enterprises as their political counterparts.
Entanglement there will surely always be, much as Hughes (1977) recognized.
To some extent, however, the degree and the structure of entanglement can be subject to influence. If we start from an observation of such financial problems as people losing their homes, it is natural to expect some collective version of the Samaritan's Dilemma (Buchanan 1975) to come into play. That dilemma can also operate for private persons, of course, and, indeed, this was Buchanan's original context. But it also intensifies in collective contexts, as Wagner (1989) 
